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The trail of the human serpent is over everything. 
W. James, Pragmatism 
 
William James developed his pragmatism at the end of the nineteenth century, inspired 
by the outcomes of modern epistemology – the same results that interested Nietzsche, 
and that James had in mind when he was elaborating his ideas on the phenomenalist 
character of human knowledge. Nietzsche’s perspectivism arose from the same cultural 
framework that influenced James, and Nietzsche dealt with the same epistemological 
relativism that the American pragmatist was concerned with. Moreover, both Nietzsche 
and James connected these questions to a broader philosophical interest in the nature 
and nurture of the human being. Their ethical concerns, in fact, cannot be isolated from 
their theory of knowledge, and the question of the value (or meaning) of truth they both 
posed must not be considered as merely an epistemological issue. On the contrary, that 
question is anthropological at its very core, for the way one approaches it can determine 
which type of man he or she will become.  
This is what I will try to show on the following pages. As I will argue, pragmatism, 
perspectivism, and anthropology represent a consistent triad, for the similarities and 
connections between the first two positions rest in their engagement with the 
anthropological question. In order to demonstrate this, I will thus a) show that 
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pragmatism is concerned with anthropology and that it deals with a fundamental issue of 
Nietzsche’s late thought (§§ 1 and 2); b) stress that the problem of the type of man (der 
Typus Mensch) is involved in Nietzsche’s questioning the value of truth, and that 
perspectivism is an alternative view to Platonic and Christian metaphysics which arises 
from the same phenomenalist conception of knowledge defended by James (§ 3); c) 
argue that Nietzsche’s interest in developing a philosophy that affirms the perspectival 
character of existence is primarily anthropological, and that this is the pragmatic criterion 
of validity that one can attribute to Nietzschean perspectivism (§ 4). 
 
I. Pragmatism and anthropology 
The connection between pragmatism and anthropology can be illustrated by making 
reference to the work of Sami Pihlström. In a paper published in 2007, Pihlström 
suggests that pragmatism can be considered as „more than a mere method,“ and argues 
that it „provides us with, or is, a philosophical anthropology“ (Pihlström 2007, § 62).1 More 
precisely, according to Pihlström, „for James as much as for Kant, philosophy 
culminates in the question, ‘What is man?’ (or more politically correctly, ‘What is a 
human being?’), that is, the key question of philosophical anthropology, which is the 
starting point for any pragmatically conceivable metaphysical inquiry“ (ibid., § 66).  
Pihlström also expressed this conclusion in his earlier book „Pragmatism and 
Philosophical Anthropology“ (Pihlström 1998). According to him, „the pragmatist urges 
to take seriously the role that our purposive, goal-oriented, and value-laden practices play 
as the background of our ways of dealing with the problems“ in many fields in 
philosophy; therefore, „the question of human nature should be in the focus of all 
pragmatistic philosophy“ (ibid., ix). Insofar as „it is humanity with reference to which 
reality is structured,“ and „the conceptual schemes and practical viewpoints through 
which alone things can be meaningfully said to exist (or fail to exist), to be real or unreal, 
                                                 
1 I made use of the open access version of this paper; therefore, I provide references to the section 
numbers that can be found in the online edition. 
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are (…) human-made,“ Pihlström  argues that „the Kantian question ‘What is man?’ is 
the core of (…) pragmatism in general“ (ibid., 132). In other words, he thinks that 
„taking human purposes and practices seriously in philosophy – as a pragmatist does – 
naturally invites the question of what this qualification ‘human’ signifies,“ for „one 
cannot appeal to human practices or human purposes without trying to find out what 
kind of beings we humans are“ (ibid., x). 
Pihlström’s observations on the pragmatist approach outline an image of this 
philosophical tradition which is different from the (analytically-oriented) one which is 
usually debated. That image might be thus summed up: 
 
a) Pragmatism is a humanism 
As is well known, William James developed his pragmatism with particular and explicit 
reference to Ferdinand Schiller’s „Humanism“ (see e.g. James 1907, chapters 2 and 7; 
James 1909, chapter 3). An exploration of this topic makes it possible to stress a 
connection between the humanistic feature of classic pragmatism and some fundamental 
questions of (philosophical) anthropology. This is exactly what Pihlström does. First, he 
conceives pragmatism as „the humanistic demand of taking human practice seriously in 
philosophy,“ for we cannot separate our theoretical concerns from the practical interests 
and values that guide whatever we do (ibid., 3). From this premise, Pihlström argues that 
any inquiries into the ways in which our life affects the world within which it takes place 
helps us understand our human life itself in this human world (ibid., 25). A humanistic 
conception of reality thus determines that any question on reality is a question about 
human nature, and this directly leads to the anthropological problem. 
 
b) Pragmatism deals with concrete and contingent life 
According to Pihlström, for a pragmatist thinker „there is no deeper philosophical 
question to ask than the question of how we should think about what we, as human 
beings, are doing in the world“ (ibid., 65). The pragmatist is therefore „concerned with 
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the concrete factuality of life“ (ibid., 75); and focuses on the „contingent conditions of 
human ways of experiencing and representing reality“ (ibid., 101); finally, attempts to 
„find meaning from within the life one contingently leads“ (ibid., 186). But all this deals 
with the question of what it is like to be a human being. Moreover, Pihlström argues that 
the pragmatic approach should consider the active role of the human being, who is 
involved in the construction of the reality she or he lives in.2 This action is not merely 
epistemological. On the contrary, Pihlström (ibid., 25) particularly stresses that „in living 
and acting in the world, we see it (…) from an ethical point of view.“ Reality is for us 
morally relevant and normatively structured; as Pihlström argues (ibid., 116), „truth 
cannot be detached from human values and individual experiences. Truths are 
constructed within human value-laden practices.“ Pragmatic humanism is therefore 
primarily concerned with our practical experience; consequently, an investigation of 
reality is inextricably intertwined with the anthropological question on the nature of the 
human being – and her or his values. 
 
c) Pragmatism is concerned with the meaning of life 
The problem of the meaning of life, a fundamental question of philosophical 
anthropology, is also addressed by pragmatism. Once again, that problem follows from 
the humanistic approach, which copes with all concrete and contingent aspects of 
human life. According to Pihlström, pragmatism attempts to „avoid anti-humanistic 
nihilism and pessimism“ (ibid., 181), that is, the view that affirms that principles of 
orientation can only be found beyond the humanly-structured world. The pragmatist 
admits that a metaphysical, absolute meaning of life cannot be found, but, contrary to 
nihilists and sceptics, he focuses on the possibility of finding a contextual and 
temporally-limited meaning for our being in the world. In particular, this meaning plays 
an important role in the evaluation of the Jamesian theory of truth and his pragmatic 
                                                 
2 Needless to say, this is an element that directly relates pragmatism with the philosophical anthropology 
of Helmuth Plessner and, particularly, Arnold Gehlen. See on this e.g. Franzese 2008, 78. 
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method. In fact, their validity cannot be demonstrated in principle, by referring to a final 
or absolute reason, but the application of the pragmatic method to that method itself is 
rather possible, and the evaluation will take into account the consequences of that 
approach for our life. As Pihlström puts it:  
 
 Pragmatism is true precisely by its own lights, on its own standards of acceptance, on those very same 
standards related to the satisfactoriness and moral consequences of a belief by which other beliefs 
must, according to James, be evaluated. In choosing her or his philosophical orientation (say, 
pragmatism), an individual makes an existential choice, in which her or his unique existence as the 
particular individual she or he happens to be is at stake (ibid., 125-126). 
 
d) The core of pragmatism is ethical 
In the above-mentioned writing on Pragmatist Metaphysics, Pihlström (2007, § 11) 
reaffirms his idea that „the world is a humanly structured world“ and argues something 
important for the purpose of the present paper. As for him, James „offers us a novel, 
pragmatic form of metaphysics, one deeply grounded (…) in the concrete conditions of 
everyday life“, but „the core of this pragmatic effort was, for him, ethical“ (ibid., §§ 18-
19). Moreover, Pihlström states that  
 
 the substantial meaning of metaphysical views the pragmatist aims at uncovering is moral, or more 
generally valuational. The true pragmatic insights into the structure and content of metaphysical 
disputes are to be achieved, according to Jamesian pragmatism, by means of an ethical evaluation of 
the rival metaphysical positions in terms of their potential humanly significant outcome. What will our 
human life in this human world be like, if we conceptualize our world in terms of a particular metaphysical position? 
This is the core pragmatic question. It is by no means ethically indifferent to us whether or not, say, 
the world is such that freedom or immortality is real. This constant pragmatic need for the ethical 
evaluation of metaphysical concepts, problems, disputes, and theories is (…) the heart of James’s 
pragmatic method (ibid., § 19, my emphasis). 
 
This reference to the ethical dimension of pragmatism has been also stressed by other 
scholars who reflected on the connection between Jamesian philosophy and 
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philosophical anthropology. Sergio Franzese, for example, argued that „the problem of 
morality [is] the central problem of James’s life and work,“ (Franzese 2008, 49) and 
focused on the dependence of the moral question upon the anthropological question. 
According to him (ibid., 50), the moral question can be posited only when the 
relationship between human being and nature has been clarified – that is, when the 
fundamental question of philosophical anthropology has been addressed.3 Given that 
morality is the highest expression of human activity and that it lies at the intersection 
between nature and culture (Franzese 2008, 73), Franzese argues that it is not possible to 
investigate James without exploring his engagement with the fundamental questions of 
philosophical anthropology. Furthermore, he believes philosophical anthropology to be 
„the privileged theoretical frame within which the development of James’s thought 
needs to be reconsidered“ (ibid., 4).4 
 
II. Facing relativism 
Pihlström sheds light on classic pragmatism and focuses on some aspects that this 
approach shares with philosophical anthropology. As will be shown, some of these 
aspects can also be found in Nietzsche’s reflections about our perspectival interpretation of 
the world. Before turning to that issue, something more must be said about pragmatism, 
in order to shift the discourse onto properly Nietzschean grounds. 
Traditionally, pragmatism is reduced to the pragmatic method as formulated by James, 
often presented in an extremely reductive version that sounds like: „p is true and q is 
                                                 
3 Franzese adopts Scheler’s definition of philosophical anthropology: „A basic science which investigates 
the essence and essential constitution of man, his relationship to the realms of nature“ (Scheler 1958, 65). 
4 Michael De Armey (De Armey 1986, 35) also suggested that „James is first and foremost a pioneering 
philosophical anthropologist,“ given his interest for a scientifically-grounded philosophical investigation of 
the human being. De Armey focused on the attention that James and the philosophical anthropologists 
pay to the historical and contingent character of human nature – that is, on their humanistic attitude (ibid., 19 
and 21) – and stressed that, during the late 1860s, James „spent most of the time reading Kant“ and 
reacted with enthusiasm to Kant’s „Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View“ (ibid., 24). 
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false, if p works and q does not“.5 The emphasis is usually put on the fact that the 
pragmatic method pretends to establish the truthfulness of an idea, with no interest in the 
actual meaning James gives to the notion of truth in his writings, nor in the fact that 
James’s attempt was first and foremost to conceive that notion in a quite new way. Thus, the 
framework of James’s reflections remains mostly neglected, and only few scholars have 
been interested in the questions he faced when he adopted Peirce’s methodology as 
philosophically fertile. That framework includes the outcomes of modern epistemology, 
the reflections of Neo-Kantian thinkers, and the revolutionary ideas of evolutionism. All 
these elements determined a potentially nihilistic and sceptical relativistic view. The sort 
of „bad relativism“ which „claims that there is really no truth (…), no objective facts, 
and no universal validity claims“ (Bernstein 2010, 109). This is what James has in mind 
when he addresses the problem of truth. He realizes that no absolute and static meaning 
of truth can be found, and therefore develops a new definition of that notion focused on 
its value for our practice and for our life.  
The problem of the value of truth is therefore fundamental for James, and it follows from 
his scientific background, as can be derived from his lecture on „Humanism and Truth“ 
published in „The Meaning of Truth“: 
 
As I understand the pragmatist way of seeing things, it owes its being to the break-down which the last 
fifty years have brought about in the older notions of scientific truth. (…) The „laws of nature“ (…) were 
supposed to be the exact and exclusive duplicates of pre-human archetypes buried in the structure of 
things, to which the spark of divinity hidden in our intellect enables us to penetrate. (…) Up to about 1850 
almost every one believed that sciences expressed truths that were exact copies of a definite code of non-
human realities. But the enormously rapid multiplication of theories in these latter days has well-nigh upset 
the notion of anyone of them being a more literally objective kind of thing than another. There are so 
many geometries, so many logics, so many physical and chemical hypotheses, so many classifications, each 
one of them good for so much and yet not good for everything, that the notion that even the truest 
formula may be a human device and not a literal transcript has dawned upon us. We hear scientific laws 
                                                 
5 This is the formulation of the pragmatist maxim given by Arthur Danto in his classic book on Nietzsche 
(Danto 1965, 54). 
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now treated as so much „conceptual shorthands,“ true so far as they are useful but not farther (James 
1909, 58). 
 
Pragmatism arises from the relativistic picture implied in modern science. The 
development of the disciplines that mostly interested James made him agnostic about the 
actual meaning of ordinary notions. Ideas, concepts, and theories reveal an inner lack of 
content. They are only human devices, useful but not necessarily truthful in the ordinary 
sense. The focus therefore shifts from the agreement of these ideas with reality to their 
fruitfulness for our description of the world. It is by referring to this fruitfulness that it is 
possible to provide principles for orientation to our scientific (and practical) activity – 
which is the aim of pragmatism. As Christophe Bouriau argues, „a pragmaticist 
epistemology consists in endorsing“ the idea that „a logically irrelevant view assumes 
some practical value insofar as it gives rise to a fruitful process“ (Bouriau 2009, 227). In 
physics, for example, „the criterion of validity for a hypothesis is not truth or knowledge 
of reality in a strict sense, but the efficiency of operations that are based on them“ (ibid., 
229). There is no need to keep on using the notion of truth to be a pragmatist. What is 
important is not that notion itself, but only the attitude towards the relativism implied in 
the rejection of the metaphysical value traditionally attributed to the elements of our 
world-description. As suggested by Bouriau (ibid., 248), pragmatist thinkers do not give 
up to nihilism or scepticism, for they „believe that from the positive practical 
implications of certain ideas, the value of these ideas may be determined, such 
implications being conceived in terms of operational convenience and of fruitfulness.“6 
                                                 
6 Bouriau’s definition allows us to include among the pragmatists thinkers and scientists such as Ferdinand 
Schiller, Hans Vaihinger, Henri Poincaré, Ernst Mach – and probably also Nietzsche. This is coherent with 
James’s idea that pragmatism is only „a new name for some old ways of thinking.“ In a review of Schiller’s 
„Humanism,“ James in fact wrote that „the enormous growth of the sciences in the past fifty years has 
reconciled us to the idea that ‘not quite true’ is as near as we can ever get,“ and argued that this new 
conception of the relative character of theories and the laws of nature is the framework out of which „has 
arisen the pragmatism of Pearson in England, of Mach in Austria, and of the somewhat reluctant Poincaré 
in France, all of whom say that our sciences are but Denkmittel – ‘true’ in no other sense than that of 
yelding a conceptual short-hand, economical for our description“ (James 1920, 449). 
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This attitude towards relativism can be found at the basis of James’s new definition of 
truth.7 Acoording to him, truth is only a secondary product of our evaluation of ideas 
and theories in practical terms. As he famously argued (James 1907, 201): „Truth of an 
idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is 
made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its 
verifying itself, its veri-fication.“8 This process is not merely epistemological. On the 
contrary, James focuses on the practical and ethical plane, and evaluates the „truth’s 
cash-value“ in experiential terms: „Pragmatism asks its usual question. ‘Grant an idea or 
belief to be true,’ it says, ‘what concrete difference will its being true make in any one’s 
actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those 
which would obtain if the belief were false?’“ (James 1907, 200). Once more, it is 
possible to see that James focuses on the value of ideas and theories for our life. He is not 
interested in truth in itself, and the very fact that he continues to use that term 
demonstrates it. James attempts to replace the older notion of truth with a new one, that 
is, to modify the value we attribute to it. As for him, truth does not correspond to reality 
anymore. It does not prove or represent anything, in the sense of reproducing it 
adequately. We can only believe in certain ideas that pass the „pragmatic test“ and prove 
their fruitfulness for our experience. Thus, the problem which James is concerned with is 
not that of truthfulness, but rather that of the value of truth – a question that also Nietzsche 
addresses and to which he attributes a deep anthropological meaning.  
 
                                                 
7 According to John Dewey (1908, 85), the briefest and most comprehensive formula for the pragmatic 
method is: „The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, ‘categories,’ supposed necessities; 
and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts.“ This approach is also emphasized by 
Bertrand Russell in his review of James’s and Schiller’s works on pragmatism and humanism (Russell 
1909). 
8 As I argued elsewhere (Gori 2013, 82), this view can be compared with Nietzsche’s observation that 
„truth is not something that’s there and must be found out, discovered, but something that must be made 
and that provides the name for a process – or rather for a will to overcome, a will that left to itself has no 
end: inserting truth as a processus in infinitum, an active determining, not a becoming conscious of something 
that is ‘in itself’ fixed and determinate“ (Nietzsche 2003, 155). 
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III. The problem of the value of truth 
During his late period of activity, Nietzsche is especially concerned with the problem of 
the „will to truth“ (see e.g. „Beyond Good and Evil,“ § 1 and „On the Genealogy of 
Morality“, III, § 24). That problem arises from his reflections on European culture and 
its morality, a culture that, Nietzsche agues, took its fire „from the flame lit by the 
thousand-year old faith, the Christian faith which was also Plato’s faith, that God is 
truth; that truth is divine“ (Nietzsche 2001, 112). As is well-known, Nietzsche thinks that 
it is time to call into question the value of that belief, and to consider if the human being 
should keep on referring to it as a principle of his epistemological and moral orientation. 
The fundamental question that Nietzsche poses is thus related to the very possibility of 
presupposing that „metaphysical faith“: „What if precisely this becomes more and more 
unbelievable, when nothing any longer turns out to be divine except for error, blindness 
and lies – and what if God himself turned out to be our oldest lie?“ (Nietzsche 2001, 
112-113). Nietzsche deals with that question also at the end of the Genealogy: after having 
argued that the „gap in every philosophy“ consists in the fact that, so far, „truth was not 
allowed to be a problem,“  he defines as his own task to tentatively „call into question (…) 
the value of truth“ (Nietzsche 2006, 113). In the „Genealogy of Morality“, Nietzsche 
stresses the importance of a critique of truth for Western culture and its anthropology. 
The problem of the „will to truth“ is in fact at the origin of the nihilistic process of 
anthropological degeneration that, in Nietzsche’s view, characterizes European morality; 
a morality that, according to him, „were to blame if man, as species, never reached his 
highest potential power and splendour“ (Nietzsche 2006, 8). In his paper on „Nietzsche and 
Philosophical Anthropology“, Richard Schacht focuses on this remark and argues that 
Nietzsche is fundamentally concerned with the anthropological question of the type of 
man and „with how it will turn out“ (Schacht 2006, 122).9 Moreover, Schacht writes that 
„it is Nietzsche’s chief preliminary concern to understand humankind as it has come to 
                                                 
9 I recently dealt with Nietzsche’s interest for the anthropological question in „Twilight of the Idols“. In 
that text, Nietzsche is especially concerned with the diagnosis of the Western European (declined) type of 
man. See on this Gori 2015. 
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be, what has contributed to its development (…), and what this can teach us about what 
we have to work with“ (ibid.).10 Moralities are precisely „among the devices that have 
significantly affected the shaping of human reality“ (ibid., 121); therefore, an 
investigation of their principles must be the first step of Nietzsche’s philosophical 
project aimed at a revaluation of ourselves (i.e., of what we are as human beings), our 
world description, our culture and – our values. In the preface to „Twilight of the Idols“, 
Nietzsche declares that his Revaluation of all Values can only be realized by means of 
sounding out the „eternal idols,“ that is, through a critique of the old truths and beliefs 
that pertain to the history of European culture (see Nietzsche 2005b, 137).11 The 
question of truth, therefore, plays a fundamental role in Nietzsche: it is the very core of 
the Christian-European culture, which expresses both its strengths and weaknesses. 
Truth is in fact a powerful notion, an idea that allowed the Platonic metaphysics to 
dominate the cultural development of Western thought. But that power slowly and 
restlessly consumed what it had helped creating; it destroyed from the inside the system 
of thought that was grounded on „the concept of truthfulness, which was taken more 
and more seriously“ (Nietzsche 2006, 119), and only lately revealed how dangerous it is. 
According to Nietzsche, the destruction of „Christianity as a morality“ that he believes is 
about to occur, is indeed the final step of „a two-thousand-year discipline in truth-
telling“ that started with Plato and which characterized European thought (ibid.). 
Nietzsche pretends to be the prophet of this „self-overcoming“ that will happen „after 
Christian truthfulness (…) finally draw[s] the strongest conclusion, that against itself“ – that 
is, „when it asks itself, ‘What does all will to truth mean?’“ (ibid.). 
Nietzsche’s observations on the will to truth suggest a possible alternative way to the 
one that led humanity to décadence. At the end of the third essay of the Genealogy, 
Nietzsche writes that the „kernel“ of the ascetic ideal that dominated European culture 
                                                 
10 Later in this paper, I will say something about Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the effects of European morality 
on the type of man.  
11 It is worth noting that Nietzsche announces as forthcoming „The Will to Power. Attempt to a 
Revaluation of all values“ in „On the Genealogy of Morality“, III, § 27, a section devoted to the 
problematization of the will to truth. 
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consists in an „unconditional will to truth,” a „faith in a metaphysical value, a value as such of 
truth“ that can be found in all the historical realizations of that ideal (Nietzsche 2006, 
112).12 This view defines the object of Nietzsche’s late task, and makes it possible to 
guess what strategy he has in mind in order to achieve his aim. To call truth into 
question means to discuss not the actual agreement of an idea with reality, but rather the 
value we ordinarily attribute to that idea itself. If Nietzsche aims to invalidate the effects 
of European morality on the type of man (see Nietzsche 2002, 91-92) and to accomplish 
the „counter-movement“ that he calls revaluation of values (Nietzsche 1999, 190), he thus 
must abandon the „moral prejudice that the truth is worth more than appearance“ 
(Nietzsche 2002, 35) and uphold a view that contrasts the dogmatism first defended by 
Plato and then by Christianity (Nietzsche 2002, 4). That type of thought is, according to 
Nietzsche, the one affirming the perspectival character of existence, and that attributes value 
to human knowledge not as a way to outline an adequate image of reality (i.e. to know 
reality as it is in itself), but rather as a means for the conservation of life (ibid.). As 
Nietzsche argues in „Beyond Good and Evil“, § 34, the ordinary dichotomy between 
„true“ and „false“ must be abandoned, and we should consider the „world of 
appearances“ as the only stage of our entire knowledge (ibid., 35). This means that the 
value of our knowledge is limited. No „objective knowledge“ can be affirmed, and the 
needed principles of both our theoretical and practical orientation can only have a 
relative validity. Therefore, Nietzsche’s late perspectival thought can be interpreted as an 
alternative to the common-sense metaphysical commitment and its belief in the 
truthfulness of the „categories of reason,“ ordinarily conceived as a „criterion of truth 
and reality“ (Nietzsche 1999, 336).13  
                                                 
12 In „On the Genealogy of Morality“, III, § 25, Nietzsche also writes that both science and the ascetic 
ideal „overestimate truth (more correctly: they share the same faith that truth cannot be assessed or 
criticized).“ 
13 The criticism of the realistic view implied in ordinary language is also a characteristic feature of James’s 
observations. In a late paper included in the collection of essays „The Pluralistic Universe“ (1908), James 
argues: „When we name and class [an immediate experience], we say for the first time what it is, and all 
these whats are abstract names or concepts. Each concept means a particular kind of thing, and as things 
seem once for all to have been created in kinds, a far more efficient handling of a given bit of experience 
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As has been demonstrated during the last decades, this anti-metaphysical view is 
grounded on the outcomes of modern science, which profoundly influenced Nietzsche 
(see on this e.g. Brobjer/Moore 2004, Heit/Abel/Brusotti 2012, and Heit/Heller 2014). 
The development of Kantianism and Evolutionism, in particular, stimulated science to 
criticise its own principles, with the aim of getting rid of the remnants of ancient 
metaphysics. That was the cultural framework of Nietzsche’s reflections: a post-
positivistic debate that called into question the value of human knowledge and the very 
possibility of a „knowledge“ and a „truth“ as they were traditionally conceived. 
On the basis of what has been argued above, it is possible to say that Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism rests upon the same grounds as Jamesian pragmatism. Both these views 
are primarily concerned with the relativization of human knowledge that follows from 
modern epistemology, and they both deal with the problem of the value of truth and its 
anthropological consequences. Therefore, perspectivism seems to be consistent with 
pragmatism. To sustain that hypothesis, something more must be said about the 
humanistic feature of Nietzschean perspectivism.14 On this subject, aphorism 354 of „The 
Gay Science“ – the only published text in which Nietzsche does not only talk of 
„perspectivism,“ but also gives us a proper definition of that term – is of particular 
relevance: 
                                                                                                                                           
begins as soon as we have classed the various parts of it. Once classed, a thing can be treated by the law of 
its class, and the advantages are endless. Both theoretically and practically this power of framing abstract 
concepts is one of the sublimest of our human prerogatives. We come back into the concrete from our 
journey into these abstractions, with an increase both of vision and of power. It is no wonder that earlier 
thinkers, forgetting that concepts are only man-made extracts from the temporal flux, should have ended 
by treating them as a superior type of being, bright, changeless, true, divine, and utterly opposed in nature 
to the turbid, restless lower world. The latter then appears as but their corruption and falsification“ (James 
1977, 559). This view can especially be compared with Nietzsche’s observation that „mankind set up in 
language a separate world beside the other world,“ and that man „really thought that in language he 
possessed knowledge of the world“ (Nietzsche 2005a, 16). On this, see Gori 2017. 
14 Richard L. Howey (1973, 152) focused on Nietzsche’s „faith in the possibility of the human being“ and 
on his „profound humanism“ in order to argue that Nietzsche developed a philosophical anthropology. As 
for Howey (ibid., 107), philosophical anthropology is „a perspective which centers around the life-
concerns of the human being“ and contrasts metaphysical views of man. Nietzsche’s humanism and 
anthropocentrism, that is, Nietzsche’s new theory of man that refuses to „ground man’s existence and his 
values in some form of transcendence“ (ibid., 159; see also 165), can thus be seen as an expression of that 
kind of anthropological concern. Finally, Howey claims that „perspectivism is the framework for 
Nietzsche’s philosophical anthropology“ (ibid., 160). 
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This is what I consider to be true phenomenalism and perspectivism: that due to the nature of animal 
consciousness, the world of which we can become conscious is merely a surface- and sign-world, a world 
turned into generalities and thereby debased to its lowest common denominator, – that everything which 
enters consciousness thereby becomes shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark; that all 
becoming conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and 
generalization. (…) As one might guess, it is not the opposition between subject and object which 
concerns me here; I leave that distinction to those epistemologists who have got tangled up in the snares 
of grammar (of folk metaphysics). Even less am I concerned with the opposition between „thing in itself“ 
and appearance: for we „know“ far too little to even be entitled to make that distinction. We simply have 
no organ for knowing, for „truth“: we „know“ (or believe or imagine) exactly as much as it is useful to the 
human herd, to the species. (Nietzsche 2001, 213-214) 
 
In this text, Nietzsche declares his scepticism about the validity of our knowledge. More 
precisely, he pretends to be agnostic with regards to purely metaphysical questions such 
as the opposition between subject and object, or the distinction between a „true“ and an 
„apparent world.“ He stresses the superficial character of our consciousness and, 
consequently, the fact that we „know“ nothing in the traditional sense.15 If we want to 
talk of „knowledge“, we need to re-define that notion and conceive it as limited to the 
„herd-perspective“. Two aspects of this last statement are worth noting for the aim of 
the present paper: 1) in „Gay Science“, § 354, Nietzsche develops his criticism of truth 
by paying particular attention to the type of man generated by Christian morality – the 
herd animal. That is to say, according to Nietzsche, any claim we make about reality is 
shaped by our morality; everything we see and know is interpreted through the moral 
values pertaining to our culture and on which our anthropological development depends. 
Therefore, perspectivism is strictly connected with anthropology. 2) This fundamental 
and unavoidable interpretive activity of the human being involves that the world we 
                                                 
15 See James’s lecture on „Pragmatism and Humanism” (James 1907, 248): „It is only the smallest and 
recentest fraction of the first two parts of reality that comes to us without the human touch, and that 
fraction has immediately to become humanized, in the sense of being squared, assimilated, or in same way 
adapted to the humanized mass already there“. 
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know is a human world. Thus, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is a humanism. According to 
him, it is not possible for us to outline an adequate image of reality and to know it as it is 
in itself, before it has been „turned into generalities“ and falsified by our intellectual and 
valuational activity. This is what Nietzsche means with „phenomenalism,“ a word that in 
„Gay Science“, § 354, he uses as a synonym of perspectivism, and that must be further 
stressed, for it can establish a direct connection with Jamesian pragmatism. 
Phenomenalism is a philosophical movement that occurred during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, and that included Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius as the most 
important contenders (see Halbfass 1989, 483ff.). The main outcome of their work is a 
development of positivism in an anti-metaphysical direction. That research program 
started from the philosophy of Kant and its problematic approach to the „thing in 
itself,“ a fundamental question of modern epistemology that has been debated by many 
thinkers that Nietzsche read (e.g. F. Lange, A. Spir, and G. Teichmüller). 
Phenomenalism is agnostic about that issue: according to that view, the problem of the 
„thing in itself“ cannot even be posed, for it rests beyond the physiological limits of 
human knowledge. Moreover, phenomenalist thinkers argue that it is not possible to 
reach an adequate knowledge of the world; therefore, the traditional notion of „truth“ as 
„agreement of an idea with reality“ must be abandoned, and the notion of truth has to 
be re-defined in instrumental and pragmatic terms. This view is consistent with 
Nietzsche’s remarks from The Gay Science quoted above, and it can be argued that a 
phenomenalist conception of knowledge is the actual premise of Nietzschean 
perspectivism. An investigation of Nietzsche’s notebooks supports this hypothesis. For 
example, the famous note in which Nietzsche argues „against the positivism which halts 
at phenomena“ that „facts are just what there aren’t, there are only interpretations“, 
contains several elements that can be referred to the phenomenalist view: 
 
We cannot determine any fact „in itself“: perhaps it’s nonsensical to want to do such a thing. „Everything 
is subjective,“ you say: but that itself is an interpretation, for the „subject“ is not something given but a 
fiction added on, tucked behind. (…) Inasmuch as the word „knowledge“ has any meaning at all, the 
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world is knowable: but it is variously interpretable; it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. 
„Perspectivism“ (Nietzsche 2003, 139). 
 
A contextual interpretation of that note – that is, an analysis that considers the relationship 
of these observations with Nietzsche’s published and unpublished texts, his readings, 
and, more broadly, his historical and cultural framework – shows the close similarity 
between Nietzsche’s view and the post-positivist conceptions of phenomenalist thinkers. 
The rejection of the existence of „facts in themselves;“ the deconstruction of the subject 
as something „given;“ the idea that an interpretative character pertains to „knowledge,“ 
and that, consequently, a redefinition of this latter notion is needed; all these are theses 
coherent with a phenomenalist epistemology grounded on the modern development of 
Kantianism and deeply influenced by Evolutionism.16  
As one can argue from the quoted note, Nietzsche connects these ideas to his newly-
coined notion of perspectivism.17 By that name, therefore, he means a humanist and 
phenomenalist conception of our knowledge. According to that view, the traditional 
theory of knowledge and truth must be abandoned, for it is not possible to go beyond 
the limits of our „apparent world.“ The new theory of knowledge to be developed will, 
therefore, reject the idea of absolute „truths“ or universal „facts“. On the contrary, it will 
admit the merely relative validity of our ideas and concepts. That does not mean that the 
very notion of truth will be rejected, that „there is no truth“. Phenomenalism (and/or 
perspectivism) only undermines the value that we attribute to the elements of our world-
description, with no interest in defending any kind of epistemological nihilism. 
The importance of this connection between perspectivism and phenomenalism for the 
present research lies in the fact that James’s pragmatism also rests upon the latter view.18 
                                                 
16 On Nietzsche’s engagement with phenomenalism, see Gori 2012. A thorough investigation of 
Nietzsche’s note from 1886-87 and her phenomenalist content can be found in Gori 2016, chapter 2. 
17 Nietzsche finds the idea of a perspectival view in Gustav Teichmüller’s book „Die wirkliche und die 
scheinbare Welt“, but the noun Perspektivismus has been coined by him. 
18 In his „Pragmatism“, James refers to Ernst Mach and his school several times (James 1907, 57 and 190), 
and his view of truth is inspired by Mach’s definition of „knowledge“ and „error“ (see Hiebert 1976, xxvi). 
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In the early 1900s, this was stressed by Hans Kleinpeter, a pupil of Ernst Mach who 
popularized the phenomenalistic worldview and explored the similarities between that 
conception and the ideas of both Nietzsche and James.19 According to Kleinpeter, 
Nietzsche is „one of the most important phenomenalists“ (Kleinpeter 1913, 27),20 but 
also „the first true upholder of pragmatism“ (Kleinpeter 1912, 406). Moreover, 
Kleinpeter argues that Mach, Nietzsche and James defended the same epistemological 
view, which is grounded on a „biological [that is, evolutionary] conception of 
knowledge“ and in the consequent idea that „there is no absolute and a priori truth“ 
(Kleinpeter 1912, 406 and 1913, 143). If one wants to avoid the nihilistic option which 
rejects the very possibility of finding principles of orientation in the world, one must 
attribute a merely relative value to truth and admit that „words, concepts and theories 
are only instruments for our practical activity“ (Kleinpeter 1912, 406). It is worth noting 
that Kleinpeter’s interpretation of pragmatism does not focus on its purely theoretical 
side, as contemporary readings usually do. On the contrary, Kleinpeter stresses that 
pragmatism aims to „get rid of the meaningless words and purely metaphysical disputes“ 
(Kleinpeter 1912, 406) and „is interested in human life“ (ibid.) and in our character of 
active beings. On that point especially, Kleinpeter finds a similarity between James’s and 
Nietzsche’s views. In dealing with the epistemological relativism that follows from the 
phenomenalistic conception of knowledge, both James and Nietzsche looked at the 
practical plane, the plane of the concrete form of life, and on that plane they found the 
principles for a new evaluation of logically irrelevant views. Thus, Kleinpeter supports 
the idea that perspectivism is consistent with pragmatism, but he also shows that these 
views have much more in common than a mere method for evaluating ideas such as: „p 
                                                                                                                                           
The influence of Mach’s psychology and epistemology on James has been explored e.g. by Gerald Holton 
(1992) and Judith Ryan (1989). 
19 His main contribution to the history of philosophy is a book titled „Der Phänomenalismus. Eine 
naturwissenschaftliche Weltanschauung“ (1913). In 1911, René Berthelot also compared Nietzschean 
perspectivism with James’s pragmatism, in the first volume of his work „Un romantisme utilitaire. Étude 
sur le mouvement pragmatiste“ (Berthelot 1911). On these interpretations, see Gori 2016, chapter 4. 
20 Moreover, on November 9th, 1912, Kleinpeter wrote to Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche that, in his view, 
Nietzsche was a „pure phenomenalist.“ On this, see Gori 2011 and 2012. 
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is true and q is false, if p works and q does not“. Perspectivism and pragmatism are 
consistent because they react to the problems of a specific culture; for they face the 
fundamental question that epistemology posed to modern and contemporary philosophy 
– namely, the question of the value of truth. 
 
IV. Anthropological privilege 
From what has been argued above, it is possible to conclude that the most important 
similarity between perspectivism and pragmatism lies in their attitude towards relativism. 
This attitude is anti-nihilistic and anti-sceptical, for both Nietzsche and James aim to 
provide man with new principles of orientation, and do not stop at the „diagnostic 
moment“ revealing the fundamental lack of metaphysical meaning of our all-too-human 
truths.21 As for the anthropological question, one can say that it permeates perspectivism 
as much as pragmatism. Firstly, as shown above, perspectivism follows from a problem 
that in Nietzsche has a deep philosophical meaning, for it is the very ground of what 
Schacht called Nietzsche’s „genealogical anthropology“.22 Nietzsche’s focus on the 
development of the human being, his interest in „der Typus ‚Mensch‘“ (see Nietzsche 2006, 
8 and Schacht 2006, 122) as has been shaped by Christian morality, led him to the 
fundamental problem of the will to truth as the kernel of the ascetic ideal. His revaluation 
of all values can consequently be interpreted as an attempt to avoid the degenerative 
consequences of the view that believes „in a metaphysical value, a value as such of truth“ 
(Nietzsche 2006, 112), and thereby to generate a „healthier“, higher human being. Thus, 
the outcomes of perspectivism, as much as its premises, have an anthropological 
                                                 
21 In his paper on „Nietzsche und die Philosophische Anthropologie“, Matthias Schlossberger argues that 
both philosophical anthropology and Nietzsche’s philosophy aimed to provide man with new principles, 
thus contrasting the „lack of orientation“ (Orientierungslosigkeit) experienced in post-Darwinian Europe 
(Schlossberger 1997, 147 and 167). Similarly, Sergio Franzese conceives philosophical anthropology as 
„the attempt to answer the anthropological question raised by Darwinian evolutionism“ (Franzese 2008, 
53), and from that premise he develops his further interpretation of James as a philosophical 
anthropologist. On the role played by the notion of „orientation“ (Orientierung) in modern and 
contemporary philosophy, see Stegmaier 2008. 
22 That is, „an anthropology attentive to the social and historical as well as biological developments that 
have contributed to the ‘becoming’ of the kind of creatures we are“ (Schacht 2015, 63). 
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relevance as well. It is only by accepting a view antithetical to the Platonic-Christian one, 
namely the idea of a merely relative character of truth, that it would be possible to realize 
a counter-movement against décadence and tentatively attain the „highest potential power and 
splendour“ of the type ‘man’ (Nietzsche 2006, 8).  
This observation invokes the question of the validity of Nietzschean perspectivism 
posed by Brian Leiter (2000). As Leiter argues, it does not seem possible to attribute to 
Nietzsche’s criticism of Christian morality an „epistemic privilege – being veridical, being 
better justified – over its target“ (ibid., 277). I agree with Leiter that the revaluation of 
values that follows from Nietzsche’s perspectivism has no metaphysical privilege, for it 
cannot be demonstrated that it is more „truthful“ or better justified (in absolute terms) 
than the rejected morality. But this does not mean that no privilege at all can be found. On 
the contrary, I believe that Nietzsche’s perspectivism can prove its validity on purely 
pragmatic and anthropological grounds. In other words, Pihlström’s above-quoted 
remark about pragmatism can be applied to Nietzsche’s view, and it can be argued that 
perspectivism, too, „is true by its own lights, on its own standards of acceptance (…) 
related to the satisfactoriness and moral consequences of a belief“ (Pihlström 1998, 125). 
Moreover, there is hardly any doubt that Nietzsche thought that „in choosing her or his 
philosophical orientation (…), an individual makes an existential choice, in which her or 
his unique existence as the particular individual she or he happens to be is at stake“ 
(ibid., 125-126).  
This evaluation of perspectivism in pragmatic terms is twofold. First, perspectivism itself 
is perspectival, that is, it is not – and does not pretend to be – metaphysically-valid.23 The 
„truth“ it set forth is as relative as the one put forward by rival views; therefore, its 
validity can only be affirmed on the basis of its fruitfulness, of its outcomes. Secondly, it 
                                                 
23 It is not necessary to complain that Nietzsche „does consider his own position superior,“ as 
Maudemarie Clark did (Clark 1991, 140f.). Nietzsche, of course, defended his view – as anyone does with 
his own ideas. But he never pretended to find absolute reasons for that, nor did he claim his position to be 
universally valid. Nietzsche developed a diagnosis of modern European culture, and he focuses on what 
should be avoided, in order to allow the proper development of the human being. The evaluation of 
Nietzsche’s view must not neglect that, and should never forget the contingent and experimental character 
of his philosophy.  
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can be argued that the „criterion of truth“ to be adopted for Nietzschean perspectivism 
is a sort of „biological utility“.24 That is to say, one must look at the existential and 
anthropological consequences that believing in that view produces. This can be inferred 
from Nietzsche’s observations, although he never affirmed that one must choose 
perspectivism for a positive outcome. In fact, Nietzsche only suggested that his view is an 
alternative to the view he invites us to avoid. More precisely, perspectivism is for 
Nietzsche a view antithetical to the one which determined the declined type of man, the 
herd animal. If one wants to avoid that anthropological degeneration – and there are no 
absolute reasons for preferring it – one possible way is to accept the perspectival character 
of existence, and to call into question the value of truth.25 
On this point, Nietzsche’s view seems to be particularly consistent with James’s 
observations on the anthropological value of the ideas we believe in. In the first lecture 
of „Pragmatism“, James talks of ideas which are „helpful in life’s practical struggles“ 
(James 1907, 76) and then argues: „If there be any life that it is really better we should 
lead, and if there be any idea which, if believed in, would help us to lead that life, then it 
would be really better for us to believe in that idea, unless, indeed, belief in it incidentally clashed 
with other greater vital benefits“ (ibid.). As has been argued above, for James the ethical 
commitment is more important than the metaphysical one. In particular, Pihlström 
stresses that, in James, the acceptance of a metaphysical stance depends upon the 
„ethical evaluation“ of that position „in terms of [its] potential humanly significant 
outcome“ (Pihlström 2007, § 19). Therefore, since we cannot demonstrate the validity of 
                                                 
24 In the posthumous note 14 [153] from 1888, Nietzsche complains that, ordinarily, „instead of seeing in 
logic and the categories of reason means toward the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (basically, 
toward an expedient falsification), one believed one possessed in them the criterion of truth and reality. 
The ‘criterion of truth’ was in fact merely the biological utility of such a system of systematic falsification.“ 
(Nietzsche 1999: 336) Therefore, Nietzsche argues that it is permitted to talk of „truth“, but only from 
that point of view, that is, if one attributes to that notion a mere relative, instrumental and utilitarian 
meaning. On this, see Gori 2013, 74 ff. and 87. 
25 Ken Gemes (1992) also observes that Nietzsche focused on the idea that certain ideas promote life (see 
e.g. Nietzsche 2003, 16). Moreover, Gemes (1992, 57) argues that Nietzsche „is involved in promoting a 
perspective that promotes his ideal kind of life [not-declining] at the price of thereby suppressing other, 
possibly equally, valid perspectives“. 
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any idea on purely intellectual grounds, the means to find our way in the world can only 
be justified by their practical usefulness – in anthropological terms. Nietzsche could be 
interpreted as supporting that position, too. His rejection of common-sense realism and 
his affirmation of the purely phenomenal character of human knowledge actually 
constitute a metaphysical commitment that Nietzsche cannot demonstrate. But it leads 
us to a different world-conception and, consequently, to a different practical behaviour. 
That metaphysical commitment can therefore only be justified in terms of its outcomes, 
depending on the interest of the individual who affirms that particular view. From what 
has been shown above, it is possible to say that Nietzsche’s interest was to criticize the 
Christian type of man, that he conceived as the product of the faith in the existence of a 
„true world.“ Therefore  Nietzsche evaluated the outcomes of a metaphysical 
commitment in purely anthropological terms, as James did.  
Hence, the similarity between perspectivism and pragmatism does not only rest on their 
premises, on the major question they face, but also on their attitude towards that 
question and on their own criterion of validity. Perspectivism, in particular, can be seen 
as a form of pragmatism that considers the type of man as the „cash-value“ of an idea. 
The anthropological question is therefore crucial for it, and it is the very ground of the 
comparison between Nietzsche’s and James’s views that I suggested in this paper. In 
other words, it can be argued that pragmatism, perspectivism and anthropology 
constitute a consistent triad. 
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